GRAPHS MIS8121.CHT THROUGH MIS8135.CHT - B FACTORS (SLOPE OF LOG-LOG GRAPH PRICE VS. EDIBLE WEIGHT)

It is my theory that this graph explains the behaviour of producers and traders for the graph MIS8001.cht above: The Graphs show that for Dar es Salaam, for all 3 sexes, the B values remain pretty constant over time at a value for B of 1.0. This in effect means that there is no price premium for better quality animals. Compare this with the graphs for Moshi and especially for Arusha: both were at 1.0 in 1992, but Moshi is now in 1994 at 1.6 for steers, 1.2 for cows and 1.5 for bulls; Arusha is now in 1994 at 1.7 for steers and bulls, and at 1.5 for cows. These are significant incentives to producers and traders to produce higher quality animals. For example, a B factor of 1.7 means that if an animal is fattened so as to have 10% more edible meat on its frame, then it will fetch a 17% higher price.

It is of interest that Moshi figures for 1991 appear to indicate that the factor for steers was then 1.3 (as compared with 1.0 for Moshi for 1992). This may imply that the pattern for these 2 northern markets is traditionally one of producing premiums for better quality cattle, and that 1992 saw a temporary fall-off in that situation...

These average edible weight per animal graphs plus the B factor graphs between them really encapsulate the most exciting findings of the MIS Project - that given a market which awards premiums for higher quality cattle, then producers and traders will rise to the occasion. This is truly a triumph for market forces. What remains to be done is to examine what are the factors which produce this quality market (we assume the informal exports to Kenya), examine how the producers and traders provide these quality animals (e.g. feedlots?), and consider whether it is desirable and/or possible that this experience be transferred to Dar or to other markets.